Abstract. We study both distinguishing and key-recovery attacks against E0, the keystream generator used in Bluetooth by means of correlation. First, a powerful computation method of correlations is formulated by a recursive expression, which makes it easier to calculate correlations of the finite state machine output sequences up to 26 bits for E0 and allows us to verify the two known correlations to be the largest for the first time. Second, we apply the concept of convolution to the analysis of the distinguisher based on all correlations, and propose an efficient distinguisher due to the linear dependency of the largest correlations. Last, we propose a novel maximum likelihood decoding algorithm based on fast Walsh transform to recover the closest codeword for any linear code of dimension L and length n. It requires time O(n + L · 2 L ) and memory min(n, 2 L ). This can speed up many attacks such as fast correlation attacks. We apply it to E0, and our best key-recovery attack works in 2 39 time given 2 39 consecutive bits after O(2 37 ) precomputation. This is the best known attack against E0 so far.
Abstract. We study both distinguishing and key-recovery attacks against E0, the keystream generator used in Bluetooth by means of correlation. First, a powerful computation method of correlations is formulated by a recursive expression, which makes it easier to calculate correlations of the finite state machine output sequences up to 26 bits for E0 and allows us to verify the two known correlations to be the largest for the first time. Second, we apply the concept of convolution to the analysis of the distinguisher based on all correlations, and propose an efficient distinguisher due to the linear dependency of the largest correlations. Last, we propose a novel maximum likelihood decoding algorithm based on fast Walsh transform to recover the closest codeword for any linear code of dimension L and length n. It requires time O(n + L · 2 L ) and memory min(n, 2 L ). This can speed up many attacks such as fast correlation attacks. We apply it to E0, and our best key-recovery attack works in 2 39 time given 2 39 consecutive bits after O(2 37 ) precomputation. This is the best known attack against E0 so far.
Background
Correlation properties play an important role in the security of nonlinear LFSRbased combination generators in stream ciphers. As name implies, the word correlation in stream ciphers is frequently referred to as the intrinsic relation between the keystream and a subset of the LFSR subsequences. The earliest studies dated back to [21, 25, 27] in the 80's and the concept of correlation immunity was proposed as a security criterion. In the 90's Meier-Staffelbach [22] analyzed correlation properties of combiners with one memory bit, followed by Golić [12] focusing on correlation properties of a general combiner with m-bit memory. Recently, a series of fast correlation attacks sprang up, to name but a few [5-7, 16, 24] . Thereupon we dedicate this paper to the generalized correlation attacks against E0, a combiner with 4-bit memory used in the short-range wireless technology Bluetooth. Prior to our work, existed various attacks [1, 8, 10, 11, 13-15, 17, 26] against E0. The best key-recovery attacks are algebraic attacks [1, 8] , whose basic approach is to use the polynomial canceling all memory bits and involving only key bits, instead of considering the multiple polynomial to cancel the key bits in the distinguishing attack; besides, [9, 13, 14] discussed correlations of E0. In [14] , Hermelin-Nyberg for the first time presented a rough computation method to compute the correlation (called bias for our purpose), but neither did they formalize the computation systematically, nor did they attempt to find a larger correlation. In [9, 13] , two larger correlations for a short sequence of up to 6 bits were exposed. However, due to the limit of the computation method, no one was certain about the existence of a larger correlation for a longer sequence, which is critical to the security of E0.
Our first contribution in the paper is that based on Hermelin-Nyberg [14] we formulate a powerful computation method of correlations by a recursive expression, which makes it easier to calculate correlations of the Finite State Machine (FSM) output sequences up to 26 bits for E0 (and allows us to prove the two known correlations to be the only largest for the first time). Second, we apply the concept of convolution to the analysis of the distinguisher based on all correlations, which allows us to build an efficient distinguisher that halves the data complexity of the basic uni-bias-based distinguisher due to the linear dependency of the two largest biases. Our best distinguishing attack takes 2 43 time given 2 43 -bit keystream with O(2 45 ) precomputation 1 . Finally, by means of Fast Walsh Transform (FWT), we propose a novel Maximum Likelihood Decoding (MLD) algorithm to recover the closest codeword for any linear code. Our proposed algorithm can be easily applied to speed up a class of fast correlation attacks. Furthermore the algorithm is optimal when the length n of the code and the dimension L satisfy the relation n ≥ 2 L , which is the case when we apply it to recover R 1 for E0. Our best key-recovery attack works in 2 39 time given 2 39 consecutive bits after O(2 37 ) precomputation. Compared with the minimum time complexity O(2 49 ) in algebraic attacks [1, 8] , this is the best known attack against E0.
This paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, a description of E0 is given.
In Section 3, we analyze the bias inside E0 systematically. Then based on one largest bias, we build a primary distinguisher for E0 in Section 4; an efficient way is shown in Section 5 that makes full use of all the largest biases to advance the distinguisher. In Section 6 we investigate the MLD algorithm for a linear code; the result is then applied to a key-recovery attack against E0 in Section 7. Finally we conclude in Section 8. 
respectively. At clock cycle t, the four LFSRs' output bits x i t , i = 1, . . . , 4, will be added as integers. The sum y t ∈ {0, . . . , 4} is represented in the binary system. Let y i t denote its i-th least significant bit (i = 1, 2, 3). A 16-state machine (the dashed box in Fig.1 ) emits one bit c 0 t out of its state σ t = (c t−1 , c t ) and takes the input y t to update σ t by σ t+1 . Finally, the keystream z t is obtained by xoring y
The detailed mechanism of the FSM is beyond the scope of the paper except the fact that the embedded delay cell (the box labeled Z −1 in Fig.1 ) makes c 0 t depend only on the initial state σ 0 of the FSM as well as the past vectors y t−1 , y t−2 , . . . , y 0 . For completeness, we briefly outline it: given y t together with the state σ t , the FSM moves into the state σ t+1 . Table 1 shows the state transition of the FSM, where the four-bit state is represented in the quaternary system (e.g. the FSM changes from σ t = 13 into σ t+1 = 32 by the input y t = 2).
More formally, by introducing two temporary bits s t+1 = (s 1 t+1 , s 0 t+1 ) each clock, the following indirect iterative expressions between s t+1 and c t+1 suffice to update c t :
One can check Table 1 by those equations. We denote λ t hereafter the content of LFSRs at time t. Then the state of E0 at time t is fully represented by the pair (λ t , σ t ). Proof. It's easy to verify that the state transition given y t = 2 (the third bottom row in Table 1 ) is indeed a linear transformation over GF (2) 4 , that actually satisfies the recurrence relation: σ t+1 = A × σ t ⊕ 01, where states σ t+1 are represented by column vectors of (c Note that
Remark 2. Since Pr(y t = 2) = 6 16 , this seemingly suggests that
As mentioned in [9, 13] (without relating to the above special case), this bit exhibits a much higher bias as shown later in Corollary 7. We will now introduce essential material in order to find a systematic algorithm to compute biases.
Proposition 3. If (λ 0 , σ 0 ) is random and uniformly distributed, then for any t -(λ t , σ t ) is random and uniformly distributed, -(c t , c t−1 , . . . , c t−24 ) is independent of y t .
Proof (sketch). The former half of the theorem is justified by the fact that (λ t , σ t ) is a permutation of (λ 0 , σ 0 ) for any t. About the latter half of theorem, first, we know that (λ t−24 , σ t−24 ) is random and uniformly distributed by previous conclusion. Thus, y t−24 , . . . , y t−1 are i.i.d. random variables all independent of both σ t−24 and y t . By Eq.(2,3,4), we complete the proof.
Interestingly, we deduce that if (λ 0 , σ 0 ) is uniformly distributed, then any sequence of 39-bit consecutive E0 keystream is uniformly distributed; in particular, no better key-recovery attack against E0 exists other than tradeoffs given a sequence of 39-bit consecutive keystream. The following definition is derived from normalized correlation [22, p.71].
Definition 4. The bias of a random Boolean variable X is defined as
The normalized correlation between two random Boolean variables X and Y is just the bias of X ⊕ Y . Assuming that y t is the sum of four balanced independent random bits and that c t is uniformly distributed, then we know that ∆(a·s t+1 ⊕w·c t ) is a constant for any a, w ∈ GF (2) 2 , denoted by Ω(a, w). Table 2 shows Ω(a, w) computed by Eq. (2), where dashed entries are zeros. The following important lemma (see Appendix A for proof) inspired by [14] , gives an easy way of computing the bias for iterative structures. Table 2 . Bias of all linear combination of st+1 and ct: Ω(a, w)
k , let X and Y be two independent random variables in E and GF (2) m respectively. Assuming
Corollary 6. We set h : (
Proof. By Eq.(2,3,4) we have
Then we apply Lemma 5 with
and we obtain
Note that the assumption of Lemma 5 holds by Proposition 3. Now we use Corollary 6 iteratively to deduce some important biases of {c 0 t } with Table 2 and the initial values δ(0, 0) = 1, and δ(a, b) = 0 for (a, b) = (0, 0). A full list of nonzero triplets is given below for illustration:
Corollary 7. Assuming (λ 0 , σ 0 ) is random and uniformly distributed, we have
Note that both biases were mentioned in [9, 13] (without formal proof). Now by Corollary 6, we can easily prove it as shown next.
Proof. We show the equivalent δ(1, 1, 1, 1, 1) = − 25 256 of the first bias as follows:
The second bias is similarly proved from δ(1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1) = 25 256 . Also, we computed all -tuple biases for ≤ 26 and found that δ(1, 1, 1, 1, 1), δ(1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1) are the only largest ones. All biases for = 6 are listed in Table 14 , Appendix C. Throughout the paper we let
A Primary Distinguisher for E0

The Connection Polynomial of the Equivalent Single LFSR
Let θ i be the order of the connection polynomial p i (x) of R i , for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Since all p i (x) are primitive polynomials, θ i = 2 Li − 1; furthermore, by Lemma 6.57 of [18, p.218] , the equivalent LFSR to generate the same sequence of the sum of the four original LFSRs outputs over GF(2) has the connection polynomial 
Finding the Multiple Polynomial with Low Weight
Let d 0 be the degree of a general polynomial p(x). We use the standard approximation to estimate the minimal weight w d of multiples of p(x) with degree at most d by the following constraint: w d is the smallest w such that
Listed in Table 3 is the estimated
To find multiples with low weight, efficient algorithms like [4] exist provided the degree is low, say, less than 2000, which does not apply to E0. So we can use the conventional birthday paradox to find Q(x) with the minimal d (i.e. w = w d ), which takes precomputation time P T ≈ O(d w− 1 2 ); or we apply the generalized birthday problem [29] to find Q(x) of same weight but higher degree with much less precomputation as tradeoff. Table 4 compares the two algorithms. In Appendix B, we also provide some non-optimal multiples as examples, including Q 4 (x) with w = 4 and d ≈ 2 65 . 
By the Piling-up Lemma [20] and Corollary 7, we know the right-hand side of Eq. (6) is equal to zero with probability
With standard linear cryptanalysis techniques, we can distinguish the keystream {z t } of E0 from a truly random sequence with γ −2·w samples, simply by checking the left-hand side of Eq.(6) equals zero most of the time. Based on Q(x) with d and w, we minimize the data complexity n by choosing n = γ −2·w + d. Table 5 shows the minimum n = 2 34 is achieved with d = 2 33 , w = 5. Table 6 summarizes the best performance of our primary distinguisher for E0 based on either the use of Q 4 (x) with weight 4 in Appendix B, or a search of Q(x). 5 The Advanced Multi-bias-based Distinguisher for E0
Preliminaries
Definition 8. Given f, g : GF (2) → R, for a ∈ GF (2) , we define
· 1 , where 1 denotes a constant function equal to 1
Note that the first two definitions correspond to convolution and Walsh transform respectively. We recall these basic facts: for any f, g : GF (2) → R, we have
-if f is a distribution, i.e. a f (a) = 1 and f (a) ≥ 0 for all a ∈ GF (2) , then the distribution of the XOR of w i.i.d. random vectors with distribution f is f ⊗w , moreover,
where ∆(A) is defined in Definition 4.
An Efficient Way to Deploy Multi-Biases in E0 Simultaneously
Given a linear mapping h : GF (2) → GF (2) r of rank r, we define r-bit vectors 
Now we discuss how to design h in order to reduce data complexity. From Baignères [2, Theorem 3, p.10], we know that we can distinguish a distribution f of r-bit random vectors from a uniform distribution with 1/∆ 2 (f ) samples. Here, the distribution of B t is f = D ⊗w A . So the modified distinguisher needs data complexity
Let k be the number of the largest Walsh coefficientsD A (b) over all nonzero b with absolute value
In order to lower n, it's necessary to have r < k. This implies the k largest coefficients are linearly dependent, which happens to be true in E0: recall that the 6-bit vectors of the three largest biases satisfy the linear relation, As a simple solution we may just pick = 6, r = 2, α 1 = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0) and α 2 = (0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) (where α i denotes the i-th row of h), then we obtain k = 3. And n is reduced to a factor of , 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0 , . . . , 0 −i−4 zeros ) for i = 1, . . . , r, then we obtain k = 2r − 1. And so the improved factor r 2r−1 of data complexity tends to 1 2 for negligible d when r goes to infinity; however, because of the underlying assumption for E0, is restricted to no larger than 26, i.e. r ≤ 22. To conclude, we show that the modified distinguisher (Algorithm 1) needs data complexity
Observe that Section 4 actually deals with the special case of r = 1. Table 7 shows the best improvement achieved with r = 22. We see that the minimum n drops from previous 2 34 to 2 33 .
Algorithm 1 The advanced distinguisher for E0
Parameters:
r DA: the probability distribution of the r-bit vector At Q(x) = P w i=1 x q i : the multiple polynomial of p1(x)p2(x)p3(x)p4(x) with degree d n: the sample size by Eq. (7) Input:
keystream z0z1 · · · zn−1 of either a truly random source S0 or the output S1 generated by E0 initialize counters u0, u1, . . . , u2r−1 for t = 0, 1, . . . ,
A (b)´> 0 then accept S1 as the source else accept S0 as the source end if 
A Maximum Likelihood Decoding Algorithm
We restate the MLD problem for a general linear code (see [19] for details) of length n and dimension L with generator matrix G (let G t denote the t-th column vector of G): find the closest codeword (x 1 , . . . , x n ) to the received vector (s 1 , . . . , s n ), and decode the message r = (r 1 , . . . , r L ) such that x t = rG t , i.e. find such r that minimizes N (r) = n t=1 (s t ⊕ x t ).
The Time-domain Analysis
Obviously, the trivial approach (yet common in most correlation attacks) to find r is an exhaustive search in time-domain: for every messager, we compute the distance N (r) and keep the smallest. The final record leads to r. The time complexity is O(n · 2 L ) with memory n-bits.
The Frequency-domain Analysis
We introduce an integer-valued function,
for all x ∈ GF (2) L , where denotes the matrix transpose. We compute the Walsh transformŴ of W as follows:
We thereby reach the theorem below.
where W is defined by Eq.(8).
This generalizes the result [19, p. 414 ] of a special case when n = 2 L and G t corresponds to the binary representation of t. So we just compute the table of W, perform FWT [30] , and find the maximalŴ(r). The time and memory complexities of
respectively. Since the precomputation of W takes time O(n) with memory O(n), we conclude that our improved MLD algorithm runs in O(n + L · 2 L ) with memory O(2 L ) (additionally, using linear transformation allows to compute FWT over GF (2) k with memory O(2 k ) where k = log 2 n ). Note that when n ≥ 2 L , the time complexity corresponds to O(n), which is optimal in the sense that it stands on the same order of magnitude as the data complexity does. Table 8 compares the original exhaustive search algorithm with the improved frequency transformation algorithm. Note that the technique of FWT was used in another context [7] to speed up other kinds of fast correlation attacks. In the next section we will see how it helps to speed up the attack [10] by a factor of 2 24 . We estimate similar correlation attacks like [6] can be speeded up by a factor of 10; undoubtedly, some other attacks can be significantly improved by our algorithm as well. 
A More Generalized MLD Algorithm
We further generalize the preceding problem by finding the L-bit vector r such that given a sequence of -bit vectors S 1 , . . . , S k and f : GF (2) → R together with matrices G 1 , . . . , G k of size L by , the sequence of -bit vectors X 1 , . . . , X k defined by X t = rG t minimizes N (r) = k t=1 f (S t ⊕ X t ). Note that previous subsections are merely a special case of = 1, k = n and f (a) = a for a ∈ GF (2).
Define a real function W by:
for all x ∈ GF (2) L . We compute the Walsh transformŴ of W as follows:
Algorithm 2 directly follows above computation. The total running time of our algorithm is
To speed up the computation of W, we could precompute the inner products of all pairs of -bit vectors in time O(2 2 ) with memory O(2 2 ). Thus, the total running time of the algorithm is O(
Algorithm 2 The generalized MLD algorithm
Parameter: f, Input: G = (G1, . . . , G k ) : the generator matrix vector stream S1, S2, · · · , S k Processing:
apply FWT to compute the table off initialize the table of W to 0 for all -bit a do for t = 1, . . . , k do increment W(aG t ) by 1 2 (−1) a·Stf (a) end for end for apply FWT to find r that achieves the minimalŴ(r) output r
In the special case that is applicable to E0 (as is done in the next section): G t+1 = AG t for t = 1, . . . , k, we precompute another table to map any L-bit vector x to xA . It takes time 2 L with memory 2 L . The total time of the algorithm is thus
7 The Key-recovery Attack against E0
We approach similarly as in [10] to transform our distinguisher of Subsection 4.3 into a key-recovery attack. Our main contribution, however, is to decrease the time complexity by applying the preceding algorithm. Let Q(x) = w i=1 x qi be the multiple polynomial of p 2 (x)p 3 (x)p 4 (x) with degree d and weight w. Using techniques in Subsection 4.2 to find Q(x) with (precomputation) complexity P C, we list the corresponding triplets (w, d, P C) for small w in Table 9 . 
It can be shown that the second addend in Eq. (9) is also an m-sequence generated by the same LFSR. For brevity, we set
for t = 1, . . . , n (it corresponds to the data complexity n + d). We rewrite Eq.(9) as
Given n-bit sequence of b t (x 1 )'s, we count the occurrences
. Using the analysis of [28] , we estimate N (x 1 ) is the smallest of all N (x 1 ) with
Note that this estimated figure is actually comparable to the conventional estimation [6, 16] on critical data complexity n 0 in correlation attacks, where
and h is the binary entropy function 6 . According to [6] simulations showed the probability of success is close to 1 (resp. 2 ) for n = 2n 0 (resp. n = n 0 ) which is consistent with our analysis. Table 10 shows our estimated minimal n for N (x 1 ) to achieve a top rank corresponding to w. Now define G t = (a 0 , . . . , a L1−1 ) , where a 0 +a 1 x+· · ·+a L1−1 x L1−1 = x t mod p 1 (x). Clearly our current problem to recover 
). So, choosing r = 12, we can halve the time and data complexities. The attack complexities to recover R 1 for E0 are listed in Table 11 . Once we recover R 1 , we target R 2 next based on multiple of p 3 (x)p 4 (x). Last, we use the technique of guess and determine in [11] to solve R 3 and R 4 with knowledge of the shortest two LFSRs. The detailed complexities of each step are shown in Table 12 . A comparison of our attacks with the similar attack 7 [10] and the best two algebraic attacks [1, 8] is shown in Table 13 . 
Conclusions
This paper formulates a systematic computation method of correlations by a recursive expression, which makes it easier to calculate correlations of the FSM output sequences up to 26 bits for E0 (and allows us to prove for the first time that the two known biases are the only largest). Then we successfully apply the concept of convolution to the analysis of the distinguisher based on all correlations, which allows us to build an efficient distinguisher that halves the data complexity of the basic uni-bias-based distinguisher due to the linear dependency of the two largest biases. Finally, by means of FWT, we propose a novel MLD algorithm to recover the closest codeword for any linear code. Our proposed algorithm can be easily adapted to speed up a class of fast correlation attacks. Furthermore the algorithm is optimal when the length n of the code and the dimension L satisfy the relation n ≥ 2 L , which is the case when we apply it to recover R 1 for E0. This results in the best known key-recovery attack against E0. Considering a maximal keystream length of 2745 bits for practical E0 in Bluetooth, our results still remain the academic interest. Meanwhile, our attack successfully illustrates the attack methodology of Baignères et al. 8 der of p i (x) for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. By definition, p i (x)|x θi + 1. On the other hand, p i (x)p j (x)|lcm(x θi + 1, x θj + 1) = x lcm(θi,θj ) + 1 for i = j, hence we deduce the following three multiple polynomials of p(x) with weight 4 with ease: Q 2 (x) = (x lcm(θ1,θ2) + 1)(x lcm(θ3,θ4) + 1), Q 3 (x) = (x lcm(θ1,θ3) + 1)(x lcm(θ2,θ4) + 1), The degrees of Q 2 (x), Q 3 (x), Q 4 (x) are approximately 2 69 , 2 70 , 2 65 respectively. Note that we may also expect optimal multiples with degree in the same order of magnitude and weight 3. 
